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G.A. Cohen on the Feasibility of Socialism; or, 
how the Market Makes Socialist Values Unlikely
Abstract
G.A.  Cohen  attempts  to  provide  a  case  for  socialism that  takes  into  consideration  the
reasons why socialism is desirable and what are some of the problems for its feasibility. He
finds that the kind of community sentiment which socialism requires is possible, but the
devices of social organization that can facilitate the growth of socialist sentiment along with
the effective transmission of information are not currently known. In short, Cohen thinks
social scientists and philosophers need to find how to harness the information transmission
capacity of market  exchange without  the motivational  encouragement  of rapacious self-
interest  that  market  exchanges  foster.  This  paper  argues  that  Cohen’s  appraisal  of  the
ineffectiveness of informational transmission in socialist planned economies in incorrect. A
democratically planned socialist economy can serve as the basis for the fostering of the
socialist community sentiment that Cohen advocates along with the required transmission
of economic price information. 
Introduction
G.A. Cohen attempts to provide a case for socialism, which takes into consideration the reasons 
why socialism is desirable and what are some of the problems of its applicability. He finds that 
the kind of community sentiment which socialism requires is possible, but that the devices of 
social organization that facilitate the growth of socialist sentiment along with the effective 
transmission of information are not currently known how to be implemented. In short, Cohen 
thinks social scientists and philosophers need to find how to harness the information 
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transmission capacity of market process without the motivational encouragement of self-interest 
that occurs with market exchanges (Cohen, 2009). 
This paper argues that Cohen’s appraisal of the ineffectiveness of informational transmission
in socialist planned economies is incorrect; and that a democratically planned socialist economy 
can serve as the basis for the fostering of the socialist community sentiment that Cohen 
advocates. Cohen underestimates the attempts made by socialist economists to develop theories 
of planned economies which effectively transmit information that also serve as the ground for 
building socialist sentiment. 
This paper will be divided into the following sections. First, there will be an overview of 
Cohen’s argument including his discussion of socialist equality of opportunity and its problems: 
socialist community sentiment and the desirability of socialism. Second, there will be a 
discussion of the prime problem of socialism, which is how to make a socialist economy work; 
Cohen finds that only markets can serve as a means for distributing information, but he wishes 
that they also didn’t encourage self-interest. An overview will be made of Cohen’s discussion of 
two anti-capitalist economic models: the Carensian scheme and the Roemerian scheme. He 
hopes that the Roemerian scheme can be added to the Carensian scheme so markets can 
distribute information without encouraging selfish motives. Third, a critique of Cohen’s 
consideration of the organizational problems of planning will be made. This part will include an 
overview of several socialist planning models. A non-market informational basis could provide a
ground for Cohen’s hope that friendship/socialist community can take hold. It will be argued that
Cohen’s conclusions about the infeasibility of socialism are unfounded due to the various non-
market socialist proposals. The concluding section will discuss the struggle for socialism within 
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capitalism and the relationship between socialist community spirit and the development of an 
anti-capitalist ethos. 
1. Cohen’s Socialist Equality of Opportunity and the Socialist Community.
Cohen advocates two principles that a society should be organized around if it is to be fair 
according to socialist standards: an egalitarian principle and a principle of community. Cohen 
finds that the egalitarian principle he advocates allows certain types of inequalities he thinks 
should be mediated. The principle of community is accordingly required to mediate these 
resulting inequalities. 
The egalitarian principle that Cohen endorses is called socialist equality of opportunity. This 
type of egalitarian principle “seeks to correct for all unchosen disadvantages, disadvantages, that 
is for which the agent cannot herself reasonably be held responsible, whether they be 
disadvantages that reflect social misfortune or disadvantages that reflect natural misfortune 
(Cohen, 2009, 17-18).” Socialist equality of opportunity thus attempts to equalize the starting 
points of people in society according to any disadvantages people have that have been brought 
about through cognitive, physical or social causes. Also, socialist equality of opportunity also 
equalizes any disadvantages that affect people by “circumstances of birth and upbringing 
(Cohen, 2009, 16)” or “socially constructed status restrictions, both formal and informal (Cohen, 
2009, 15).”1 
1 These additional disadvantages of socially constructed status and the effects of birth and upbringing are identified 
by Cohen as corrected by two different principles of equality, respectively bourgeois equality of opportunity and 
left-liberal equality of opportunity (Cohen, 2009, 14-16). Socialist equality of opportunity contains both of these 
other egalitarian principles and in addition includes equality for all unchosen disadvantages (Cohen, 2009, 14). 
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But, socialist equality of opportunity allows three types of inequalities because people have 
different preferences with regard to how they use their income and their ratio of work to leisure. 
Thus, people can have very different social outcomes because they can use their income or their 
time in any way they wish.2  Three kinds of inequalities emerge due to these preference ranges: 
1) inequalities resulting from lifestyle preferences, 2) inequalities resulting from regrettable 
choice, and 3) inequalities resulting from option luck (Cohen, 2009, 25-33).   The first kind of 
inequality Cohen thinks is unproblematic and he doesn’t discuss it further (Cohen, 2009, 25). 
The second and third kinds of inequalities Cohen thinks are very problematic for a socialist 
society and he devotes considerable space to their examination.
Inequalities resulting from regrettable choice are due to people not taking the time to 
consider if their choices are to their liking. For example, people may regret their selection of job 
training, the actual tasks of their job, or the remuneration of their chosen profession (Cohen, 
2009, 27). Cohen realizes that people’s poor choices are not subject to grievance since they are 
unforced. But, the regrettable choices that people make may result in inequalities that should be 
avoided for society to be cohesive. The outcomes that arise from option luck can also create 
inequalities that are not due to any wrong being committed. If people can control their incomes 
in anyway they wish they could invest or spend it in ways that will result in inequalities. Once 
again, these inequalities can be detrimental to the cohesiveness of society. 
In order to limit the effects of these inequalities Cohen recommends that a principle of 
community must temper the principle of socialist equality of opportunity (Cohen, 2009, 34-35). 
2 Since Cohen does not introduce the typical aspects of socialism until he discusses the principle of community I 
have found it out of place that people can have a preference for dividing up their work to leisure ratio in any way 
they wish. The ability to select how much you wish to work seems dependent on socialization of the means of 
production, which is never explicitly stated by Cohen. Accordingly, the problems resulting from being able to 
choose how much one wishes to work would require that one can choose to do so; which means that the first mode 
of the principle of community, limited income inequalities, already obtains. This is the case because if one can limit 
the range of wages then one can also limit the amount of time spent at work. 
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There are two modes to a socialist principle of community: limitation of inequalities in income 
and wealth and communal reciprocity. The first mode is simply the limitation of economic 
inequalities in order to prevent society developing into two, or more, separate communities 
without a shared common life (Cohen, 2009, 35-36). People who live at significantly different 
income levels have different conceptions of what their lives should be about. For example, an 
Indian peasant’s concerns about the problems of her life are significantly different than a 
Mumbai biochemist’s. Limiting economic inequalities so people share a common community 
perspective lessens the effects of regrettable choice and option luck. If income and wealth are 
limited to a certain range, then the results of people choices will be limited in the scope of 
disadvantage. 
The second mode of socialist community spirit Cohen calls communal reciprocity. As he 
puts it: “Communal reciprocity is the antimarket principle according to which I serve you not 
because of what I can get in return by doing so but because you need or want my service, and 
you for the same reason, serve me (Cohen, 2009, 39).” Communal reciprocity differs from 
market reciprocity because in the market variety people exchange services “on the basis of cash 
reward (Cohen, 2009, 39).” The second mode of socialist community spirit involves people 
altering their motivations for why they participate in the economic sphere. The first mode of 
economic inequality does not necessarily alter the way people think about their economic 
actions. One could still truck and barter seeking cash reward with a limit on the amounts one 
could accumulate. But, the second mode requires people to exchange with others’ needs and 
wants in mind. 3 It thus requires that people think of others as their friends and not as mere 
3 Cohen discussed extensively the limits of redistribution without a change in political sentiment in Cohen, 2008. 
Cohen position is in contrast to DeMartino’s and Burczak’s who self-described anti-essentialist normative positions 
take the lead from the capabilities work of Nussbaum and Sen (DeMartino, 2003, 2004; Burczak, 1998, 2006). 
Capability theory is understood by Sen to be consequentialist (Sen, 1999, chapter 3).  Cohen, on the other hand, 
considered his position to be a deontological one (Cohen, 2008, 4). Cohen, DeMatino, Burczak, and Sen all search 
for a common ethos for society to be grounded upon, but the range of this common ethos is different for all of them 
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mechanisms to achieve their desires: “It suffices that I treat everyone with whom I have any 
exchange or other form of contact as someone toward who I have the reciprocating attitude that 
is characteristic of friendship (Cohen, 2009, 52).”4 
The second mode of communal reciprocity further limits the inequalities produced by 
regrettable choice and option luck by rendering their outcomes as something that should be 
rectified as opposed to in market reciprocity where the outcomes are understood to be of no 
importance. In addition, these outcomes of inequality can easily be understood as beneficial 
since within market exchange the loss of others increases the ability of one to obtain what one 
wants, whereas communal reciprocity would find such a loss as destructive to the social unity 
that allows for socialism (or really, any society) to flourish. Cohen is skeptical that Pareto- 
efficient outcomes require differential remuneration (Cohen, 2008, chapter 2).5 
and how one derives this ethos is also different for each. The capability theorists take an inductive approach to how 
a set of capabilities can be compiled (Sen, 1999, chapter 10; Demartino, 2003, 22; Burczak 2006, 84). Cohen favors 
an intuitionist approach, which he describes as: “[W]e determine the principles that we are willing to endorse 
through an investigation of individual normative judgments on particular cases, and while we allow that principles 
that are extensively supported by a wide rage of individual judgments can override outlier judgments that contradict 
those principles, individual judgments retain a certain sovereignty (Cohen, 2008, 4.)”
4 Cohen notion is reminiscent of Aristotle’s concept of concord, i.e. political friendship, (Aristotle, 1984, 170, 
1167b3-9).
5 Cohen’s interest in ameliorating the effects of regrettable choice and option luck violates Hayek’s and Burczak’s 
concerns with incentives. If people were not responsible for their life’s outcomes then this would create 
inefficiencies (Burczak, 1998; 2006, 35). Cohen’s consideration of what are morally acceptable incentives renders 
his consideration of the Hayek-Burczak critique to be unjust (Cohen, 2008). Burczak’s use of the labor theory of 
property is at odds with Cohen’s normative position. Cohen critiques the labor theory of property and an extension 
of the theory called self-ownership in his extensive analysis of Nozick. Cohen thinks that the self-ownership stance 
is ultimately indefensible and can’t be used to justify redistribution (Cohen, 1995). But, Burczak’s endorsement of 
redistribution outside of the market via a welfare state and the redistribution of wealth through stakeholder grants 
does lean in the direction that a socialist community spirit is in place to promote such redistribution (Burczak, 2006, 
137 and 143). Burczak is able to have the labor theory of property and redistribution since he does not adopt a 
natural rights based normative position. DeMartino, another socialist concerned with normative matters, endorses 
“democratic decision-making over surplus production, appropriation, and distribution (DeMartino, 2003, 22).” Also,
DeMartino wants to stress the importance of class justice. This requires the public acknowledgment of an ethos that 
legitimizes socialist normative claims (DeMartino, 2003, 27). Burczak criticizes the extent of DeMartino’s 
normative theory as running afoul the critiques of centralized planning (Burczak, 2004). Such decision-making and 
class publicity would necessitate some kind of encouraging mechanism for the development of a socialist 
community spirit. As discussed below Cohen neglects, at least in his work under consideration in this paper, the 
formation of socialist community spirit through the struggle for socialism within capitalism. One could argue that 
Cohen does endorse such formation elsewhere (Cohen, 1983). DeMartino acknowledges such formations 
(DeMartino, 2003, 29). 
6
2. Can Socialism Be Made to Work? Cohen’s Endorsement of Market Socialism with 
Socialist Community Spirit
Cohen’s explanations of the results of socialist principles of equality and of community 
demonstrate what he thinks are a plausible case for the desirability of socialism (Cohen, 2009, 
52). But, Cohen knows that the apparent desirability of socialism does not demonstrate 
socialism’s feasibility. Cohen lists two reasons why socialism is commonly considered not to be 
feasible, which in turn determine his endorsement of market socialism with a socialist 
community spirit. The two reasons are: first, that people are “by nature insufficiently generous 
and cooperative;” second, “even if people are, or could become, in the right culture sufficiently 
generous, we do not know how to harness that generosity; we do not know how, through 
appropriate rules and stimuli, to make generosity turn the wheels of the economy (Cohen, 2009, 
55).” Of these two reasons Cohen thinks that the second is the most pressing problem (Cohen, 
2009, 57-58).
Why Cohen thinks the second reason, of how to make a socialist economy work, is the 
biggest problem is because of what he considered to be the current view of many socialist 
economists on the transmission of information, which is that only the market can do this 
efficiently (Cohen, 2009, 60). This is why Cohen thinks that only some kind of market socialism 
is a possible answer to the second reason of infeasibility. 
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If only a market can transmit information correctly then Cohen is faced with a problem about
the motivational effects of market exchanges (Cohen, 2009, 61). As he showed earlier, market 
exchanges do not foster communal reciprocity; they do not create a community of friendship that
is necessary to effectively eliminate the inequalities of regrettable choice and option luck. Cohen 
thus has a dilemma: how does one use the market mechanism to do something that it has never 
done, nor will ever seem to do? Since markets are effective transmitters of information when 
they are competitive,6 how can Cohen have a market operate in a manner that is apparently 
contrary to its effective operation?
 Cohen does have an ingenious solution, but as will be shown it does not really solve the 
problem of the second reason for infeasibility. His solution is a combination of two theories by 
Joseph Carens and John Roemer. Roemer developed a theory of market socialism where all 
people own stocks in firms that have been socialized. People cannot sell the stock they are given 
but they can trade their stocks for other stocks and they also enjoy dividend payments. Roemer’s 
scheme accordingly allows for the efficiency of capital markets without the existence of 
capitalists (Cohen, 2009, 70-71).7 Thus, Roemer’s scheme provides the required efficient transfer
of information, which Cohen thinks only a market can provide. Also, Roemerian market 
socialism does limit inequality, according to the second mode of community, by preventing 
people from cashing out of the stock market. But, Roemer’s scheme alone does not provide for 
communal reciprocity: “Market socialism is also a deficient socialism because the market 
exchange that lies at its heart tends against the value of community (Cohen, 2009, 75).” But, it 
must be noted, thought Cohen does not mention it, that Roemer’s scheme does eliminate large 
6 As will be discussed below, socialists who advocate planning rely on the conclusion that markets are not 
competitive most of the time. Rather, they find that market failure is pervasive and significant. If this is true then the
case for markets as efficient transmitters of information is called into doubt.  
7 Cohen is summarizing Roemer, 1994.
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wealth holdings and thus limits the gains individuals can obtain from fostering the creation of 
negative externalities, thereby homogenizing the potential gains and losses of a populace. 
Roemer’s market socialism does lessen the antagonisms between people, but it does not provide 
a basis for the formation of a socialist community spirit.8  
In order to correct the absence in Roemer’s model Cohen thinks that the use of a scheme that
was proposed by Joseph Carens may help.9 Carens scheme is where, in Cohen’s words, “a 
society in which what looks like a standard capitalist market organizes economic activity, but the
tax system cancels the disequalizing results of the market by redistributing income to complete 
equality (Cohen, 2009, 63).” Carens’ scheme thus “relies entirely on non-self-interested choice” 
to allow for efficient informational transfer and communal reciprocity to obtain (Cohen, 2009, 
65). The possibility of a combination of both Roemerian and Carenian scheme would allow for a 
socialist market economy to be both efficient and foster socialist values.
Cohen’s solution for the second reason of infeasibility does not demonstrate how a socialist 
spirit of community is built. In order for the Carens’ effect to ameliorate the motivational 
problem of market exchanges a socialist spirit must already exist. A Carens’ post-market 
exchange redistribution requires people to be both rational wealth maximizers, in the sense of 
distributing resources to their most efficient use, and to also ultimately want their maximization 
to be for communal reciprocity.10 It seems that the Carens’ system will work if it already works, 
which means simply, there is no explanation of how to make it work. Cohen does realize the 
8
 Burczak finds that Roemer’s scheme is lacking on the formation of socialist appropriative justice (2006, 137). The 
lack of people having control, or appropriation, of the productions of their labor will not foster a socialist spirit 
within the firm. But, Burczak’s appropriation justice does not included societal members beyond the firm. This level
of appropriative justice Burczak finds will lead to the problems indicative of Hayek’s critique of central planning 
(Burczak, 2004). 
9 The scheme that Cohen discusses is from Carens, 1981. 
10 A market equilibrium will distribute anything which people prefer, thus people must prefer their maximizations 
are for community reciprocity and not for market dominance for the Carens proposal to work. On this point see Sen, 
1999, 118. 
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shortcomings of his tentative recommendations for a feasible socialism (Cohen, 2009, 95). He 
may have reached a more definite conclusion if he considered planning based theories of 
socialism.  
3. Planned Economies and the Promotion of Socialist Values
To restate Cohen’s conclusion: Cohen finds that the main problem for the feasibility of socialism
is that people do not know how to make a socialist society work. According to Cohen’s analysis, 
there is no known mechanism to transfer information efficiently in an economy other than a 
market; but the market, while allowing the efficient transfer of information, does not foster the 
growth of communal reciprocity. In this section I will argue against Cohen’s conclusion that the 
only way to transfer information with an economy is via the market. If there is an effective 
planning mechanism that can transfer information and foster the growth of communal reciprocity
then the feasibility of a socialist society is greater than Cohen thinks. This section will give a 
brief review of planned economies that have existed, give an overview of market failure, 
consider several proposals for planned socialist economies, discuss the potential for planning to 
foster communal reciprocity, and briefly discuss the problems of innovation and incentives 
within socialist economies. 
The common understanding of the performance of planned economies has definitely colored 
people’s appraisal of the effectiveness of planning. Daivd Kotz and Fred Weir analyzed the 
performance of the economy of the Soviet Union and have found that many of the conventional 
understandings of Soviet performance are incorrect (Kotz and Weir, 1997). In their work they 
have demonstrated that the Soviet planning system always registered positive growth rates after 
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the Second World War, but growth did slow down from the mid-1970’s onward (Kotz and Weir, 
1997, 42 and 45). Also, contrary to Cohen’s understanding of planned economies the Soviet 
economy was able to grow beyond industrialization and did achieve advances in certain areas 
(Cohen, 2009, 67; Kotz and Weir, 1997, 1 and 51). 
One of the most important observations by Kotz and Weir is that the Soviet economy only 
failed to grow when it was being actively dismantled from 1990 onward (Kotz and Weir, 1997, 
75). As noted, slowdown in growth and technological innovation did occur, but the Soviet 
economy did have some features of a socialist community, such as: full-employment, free 
education, low cost child-care, low rents, inexpensive vacations, free health care, and guaranteed 
pensions (Kotz and Weir, 1997, 27.)11 
Also, we must remember that even though centrally planned economies did have growth 
problems there is not widespread agreement of the supposed efficiency of markets to transmit 
information. Minqi Li goes as far as to question the superiority of the market process over 
planning due to market failures: 
According to the “market socialists,” an economic system based on central planning (or allocation of 
resources according to political and social decisions) is inevitably inefficient as the planning 
authority lack the sufficient amount of accurate information to make the appropriate decisions. 
However, as is widely recognized by all heterodox economists and indeed some neoclassical 
economists, the capitalist market economy suffers from various “market failures” that are comparable
to or worse than the informational problem of central planning. Thus, at a theoretical level, it is by no
means obvious whether an “imperfect” capitalist market economy is at all more “efficient” than a 
central planned economy. (Li, 2008, 179-180).12
11 On the performance of the Chinese economy during its socialist phase (1948-1975) see Li, 2008.
12 Hahnel has an extensive discussion of market failures (2002, 84-99). He summaries his analysis as: ”Theory tells 
us free market economies will allocate too much of society’s resources to goods whose production or consumption 
entail negative external effects, and too little to goods whose production or consumption entail positive external 
effects, and there is every reason to believe the misallocations are significant. When markets are less than perfectly 
competitive – which they almost always are – and fail to equilibrate instantaneously – which they always do – the 
results are that much worse (Hahnel, 2002, 99).” See E.K. Hunt for an additional consideration of how markets 
foster an “invisible foot,” which is the propensity for market actors to seek negative externalities due to the gains 
produced by these externalities, (Hunt, 1992, 488; Hunt and D’Arge, 1973).
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Li also finds that the coordination failures of a market economy make problems such as 
environmental decay impossible to correct within a market system. Planning may be the only 
way to prevent environmental catastrophe and the only way to equitably structure a world 
economy dealing with the repercussions of climate change (Li, 2008, 180).13
Laibman has argued that market generated prices fail to accurately account for social 
reproduction prices, the replacement value of capital goods, and noise created by short-term 
fluctuations. The reproduction of a society depends on assets that are not held by individual 
private (or market socialist) firms. Since these assets are not part of the pricing of commodities 
their costs are externalized. Thus, the reproduction of a society’s productive capacity is not 
effectively registered in the market pricing of commodities: 
As the enterprise becomes more and more dependent on wider social activities (in particular, the 
educational system) for generation of the resources used in production, this externality grows over 
time, and the cost of the discrepancy between market-socialist equilibrium prices and social 
reproduction price rises. The social reproduction prices, if used as the benchmark prices within a 
comprehensively planned socialist system, imply that rates of return emerging from enterprises’ 
internal accounting will differ. The link between those rates and the remuneration of the enterprise 
staff will therefore have to be differentially normed, to ensure equity in returns to effort across 
industries. This can only be accomplished in a planned system;… (Laibman, 1992, 77).
Second, market generated prices can’t accurately price the replacement value of capital 
goods because market prices are unable to take a sufficiently long time horizon. This inability of 
market-generated prices to do this prevents effective budgeting for investment. But, planning can
take such budgeting into account: “planning establishes a significantly longer horizon than is 
possible under a regime of atomistic competition, resulting in a different optimal price vector 
(Laibman, 1992, 78).” 
13 Foster, Hahnel, O’Neill and Burkett also discuss the problems of dealing with environmental problem via market 
structures: (Foster, 2009, 61), (Hahnel, 1992, 88-96), (O’Neill, 2002) and (Burkett, 1999, 110). 
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Finally, short term fluctuations of market driven prices will generate high transaction costs 
compared to planned prices: “It is clear, however, that in a regime of continual spontaneous 
adjustment of prices, the cost of information is high, compared to one with given price lists. The 
randomness and particularity of prices creates a veil of noise and uncertainty, making efficient 
choice more difficult (Laibman, 1992, 78).” Simply put, the market generation of prices 
fluctuates too much to be effective transmitters of information.
Now that the problems generated by markets have been reviewed, there will be a 
consideration of two types of economic planning theories: Pat Devine’s and Paul Cockshott’s 
and Allin Cottrell’s.14 Devine’s theory would involve planning based on the successive 
coordination by different groups and bodies throughout society:
[I]nvestment decisions are made by what I have called negotiated coordination bodies, on which are 
represented the interest affected by the interdependent set of investment decisions under consideration. The 
social owners at this level include all the enterprises in the industry or sector; the localities in which they are 
based, and regional, national or international planning commissions, depending on the character of the activity 
involved, together with any other groups with a legitimate interest in the outcome. (Devine, 2002, 78).15
Prices of primary inputs will be decided “at the level of the economy as a whole (Devine, 2002, 
79.)” Whereas individual firms will set prices according to the “long-run cost of production 
(Devine, 2002, 80).” Devine’s theory would allow for a market in the exchange of commodities 
but not the investment decisions of a society as a whole.16 The decisions made by negotiated 
14 Other notable planning theories not discussed here are those of Michael Albert and Robin Hahnel (1992 and 2002)
David Laibman (1992, 2002, and 2007) and Ernest Mandel (1986 and 1992).
15 Burczak would find these negotiated coordination bodies would be subject to the Hayek style knowledge 
problems due to the inability for all of the actors to reach an outcome which would be as wealth maximizing as the 
market. But, the question must be asked if the benefits of negotiated coordination outweigh the superior wealth 
performance of a market economy. Burczak himself in using Nussbaum’s and Sen’s capability theory does realize 
that the evaluative spaces of capability theory and wealth maximization are different (Burczak, 1998; 2006, 29-37, 
54, 95). In short, there are different standards of optimal outcomes. If we accept that the wealth maximization is not 
the only, or even best, determination of optimal outcomes then the benefits of negotiated coordination (absence of 
market failures, integration of the goals of various actors, long-term organization of development and resource use, 
and the facilitation, discussed below, of an egalitarian ethos) may be more desirable to market outcomes. 
16 Devine makes a distinction between market exchange and market forces: “Market exchange involve the 
sale/purchase of the output of existing productive capacity. The operation of market forces is the process through 
which changes in the structure of productive capacity brought about by investment and disinvestment are 
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coordination bodies would be based on the results of the sales of these different firms. The 
market will not use competition as a process to determine which ‘winning’ firm’s investment 
will be maintained. The anarchy of production within a market is mediated through the planning 
process; this includes wage setting, innovation, and sustainability (Devine, 2002, 79-82). 
Allowing the market to set wages can be a race to the bottom when competition and 
unemployment exist. Innovation, when firms seek to out compete or to maintain monopolies, can
entail many pointless additions to consumer items or the marking of harmful and irrational 
items.17 Finally, it appears that capitalism may be unable to deal with the problem of free ridding 
when it comes to environmental regulation.18  But, the shared cost of environmental preservation 
could be effectively dealt with by decisions made by negotiated coordination. The equitable 
distribution of gains and losses through democratic planning could prevent the rational choice to 
free ride, since people would have to discuss their preferences as opposed to them being 
concealed behind the veil of the market.  
The planning theory of Cockshott and Cotrell has a similar planning structure of 
coordination through democratic procedures (Cockshott and Cottrell, 1993, chapters 4 and 13). 
The specific accomplishment of their model is the fast transmission of prices electronically and 
the calculation of prices (as labor values) by Gaussian elimination. Gaussian elimination done by
computers would allow for the calculation of prices for the entire economy in a matter of minutes
as opposed to thousands of years if this process were not used (Cockshott and Cottrell, 1993, 50).
These prices could be sent out to firms “every 20 minutes” via an electronic transmission 
coordinated in capitalism (and market socialism) [Devine, 2002, 76].” Laibman also uses a similar distinction (1992,
2002, 2007).
17 On innovation being driven not by genuine need satisfaction but by profitability within capitalism see Baran and 
Sweezy, 1966, chapters 4 and 5. Hahnel also has a discussion of the rational but harmful marketing of car 
consumption: Hahnel, 2002, 85-88.
18 Cockshott and Cottrell, 1993, 65; Burkett, 1999, chapter 9; Li, 2008, chapter 6; Foster, 2009.
14
network (Cockshott and Cottrell, 1993, 51). In turn, firms can inform the computation network of
changes in prices (changes in the labor values of products) via the same network. 
Of these two models the Cockshott and Cottrell one appears best situated to overcome the 
calculation problems forward by Hayek as why socialism will be sub-optimal. Burczak market 
socialist model is specifically constructed to deal with Hayek’s challenges (Burczak, 2006). He 
thus opts for the market in order to avoid these problems. Cockshott’s and Cottrell’s computer 
calculations would provided approximated answers to an item’s value that they find would be 
more accurate than an approximation derived by the market process (Cockshott and Cottrell, 
1993, 50). Hayek’s and Burczak’s calculation problems could be solved via this planning 
process, providing accuracy in the valuation of produces while also avoiding the antagonisms of 
the market which Cohen is concerned with. 
These two models demonstrate that socialist economists do think that planning can 
effectively transmit information when there is the use of multi-level decision making bodies in 
coordination and current computing technologies are implemented. Both Devine and Cockshott 
and Cottrell find their theories to escape the problems that plagued Soviet planning (Devine, 
2002, 72; Cockshott and Cottrell, 1993, 5 and 78-80; Cockshott and Cottrell, 2002). Since the 
problems planned economies suffered from in the past have been considered by these authors, 
and their theories are developed to correct these problems, this brings Cohen’s definitive 
exclusion of planning for a basis to build communal reciprocity into question. 
Also, these authors have stated that the planning/coordination process can be the basis for 
the development of socialist values. As Devine puts the matter. 
A socialist society needs an economic system that promotes the self-activation and self-development of its 
citizens. The model of participatory democratic planning outlined … is consistent with the objective. It is 
constructed around the concept of negotiated coordination. Unlike coordination through the coercion of either 
market forces or state direction, negotiated coordination requires people to engage consciously with their 
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interdependence, with the consequences of their actions for others. It encourages people to transcend their 
sectional or partial interests and take account of the situation of others. It also, I believe, incorporates a dynamic
that goes with the grain of abolishing the social division of labor. Indeed, its successful operation probably 
depends on this. (Devine, 2002, 74).19 
The activity of planning helps foster the community sentiment that Cohen thinks is important. 
This is in contrast to the market process that motivates people to be self-interested according to 
Cohen (2009, 61-75). The general feeling of societal-wide friendship that Cohen thinks is 
required for the community to obtain could be developed through the discussion that the 
planning process enables (Cohen, 2009, 52). The public debate which planning requires will 
bring people into contact with others discussing their needs and desires. Thus, people will have 
to consider how their preferences coincide with the preferences of others, and they will see how 
their preferences may preclude other people’s preferences from being satisfied. The democratic 
planning process has the potential to overcome the problem Cohen identifies with market 
exchanges: people seeing others as a means for their satisfaction, as opposed to the joint 
satisfaction of both of their preferences as an end of their exchanges of service (Cohen, 2009, 42-
43).20 
The consideration of incentives and innovation is a common point in market socialist 
literature.21 It is usually understood that the market process and the ability to profit from one’s 
firm are the only suitable ways to foster incentives for people to improve the production process 
19 See also: (Devine, 2002, 84); (Laibman, 1992, 81); (Albert and Hahnel, 2002, 9); O’Neill, 2002,147); and 
Mandel, 1992, chapter 5). In contrast the market socialist theory of Burczak facilitates participation as the firm level,
but not at the societal level. This is the case because Burczak accepts Hayek critique of central planning where tacit 
local knowledge cannot be transmitted, and all attempts at macro coordination will be sub-optimal. Thus, societal 
wide control over a society will only take place outside of the market (such as stakeholder grants to all young adults)
in order to not disrupt the market process (Burczak, 2006, 134). 
20 Burczak’s market socialist theory makes use of a labor theory of property and capability theory to argue that 
people should appropriate their products of labor since it promotes human flourishing. But, Burczak’s laudable 
theory only addresses justice for individuals in the work process; it does not address how we should treat people 
who suffer from regrettable choice and option luck, other than the use of stakeholder grants and the outside the 
market redistribution via a welfare state (Burczak, 2006, 117 and 143).  
21 See the following on incentive concern’s voiced by market socialist about planned socialism: Schweickart 1996, 
316; Nove, 1991, 55; Burczak, 2006, 35, 143.  
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and seek new inventions. It has been noted by Kotz that innovations do not always increase 
human welfare, rather innovations are selected for production due to their profit generating 
prospects (Kotz, 2002, 97). If this is the case leaving innovation only to the dictates of 
profitability will not prevent the creation of harmful products, particularly if market socialist 
firms can gain at the expense of others.  Also, the creation of certain products can create negative
externalities that firms can profit from.  With the poor innovation record of the Soviet Union in 
mind Kotz finds that there are several devices that can be used to foster innovation: the use of 
industry boards to monitor firms, having multiple firms in a given industry to use as a basis for 
comparison, and the development of a innovation board to foster new techniques and products 
(Kotz, 2002, 103-104). Kotz also finds that a democratically planned socialism which involves 
community members and members of firms in planning decisions will create a dynamic where 
innovation will be asked for by community members. The Hayekian innovation problem may be 
sidestepped by widening the control over output from only the firms themselves to the 
community. The different interests of community members and firm members would help 
stimulate innovation and would help prevent firms from seeking profits from harmful products 
(Kotz, 2002, 102).
Moral/psychological incentives are argued for by Cohen and he thinks they are the only just 
way to organize benefits and burdens in a society (Cohen, 2008). Cohen answers Hayek’s 
concerns (indirectly) about incentives within socialist firms by subordinating it to the moral 
vision people need to have for their society to overcome option luck and regrettable choice. But, 
other socialist find that the building of socialism and the construction of a socialist community 
spirit is a process, not an immediate affair, and engage in the incentive debate in a nuanced way. 
17
They find that material incentives are thought to be required while people develop a socialist 
ethos. As Laibman understands the situation:
Paying due attention to the development of this problem [of incentives] in many 20 th century socialist
contexts, all experience suggests that, given initial ideological bias towards the moral/collective pole 
and away from the material/individual one, the inherent need for material/individual differentiation 
and stimulation, at historically given level of social consciousness, has made itself felt. (Laibman, 
2002, 124-5).22
 
Incentives are not an either/or problem between material and moral/psychological. Rather, 
material incentives can be used in conjunction with democratic planning to develop a socialist 
community spirit overtime. It will become apparent that the demand for more income by some 
members means less for others. People will only know that this is the case if there is a forum for 
the expression of benefits and detriments. A market process is an anonymous mechanism for 
how remuneration decisions are made. Having to states one’s case for more or less income for 
oneself or others make remuneration decisions an overt process.23 
The endorsement of a democratically panned socialism depends on a critique of the market 
process. Market socialist authors focus on how the market can be an efficient mechanism for the 
transmission of information and the creation of incentives. While planning socialists discuss the 
inability of the market to transmit information accurately and foster incentives for desirable 
outcomes. Cohen’s worry about there not being a suitable mechanism for the construction of a 
socialist community spirit thus merits a consideration by market socialist of the critique of 
markets provided by planning socialists. Further, there is a breakdown in communication 
between these two socialist groups. Planning socialist need to address in particular the Hayek 
22 For another consideration of material incentives by planning socialists see Cockshott and Cottrell, 1993, 34.
23 Interestingly, Cohen endorsement of the interpersonal test of remuneration (where people must explain why they 
need more income in order to produce a certain amount) could actually be achieved in the forums of democratic 
planning. Thus, Cohen missed how planning would facilitate his philosophic arguments for equality (Cohen, 2008, 
chapter 1).
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knowledge problems and incentive concerns brought up by Burczak, Schewickart, and Nove; and
market socialist have to demonstrate that market failures are not as pervasive and significant as 
planners have argued. This is particularly the case if market failures can only reasonably be 
rectified by extensive government regulation (Hunt, 1992, 570-571). 
Planning may have the potential features for the fostering of communal reciprocity. But we 
must remember that planning when not democratic can prevent the growth of communal 
reciprocity just as capitalism can. Kotz and Weir find the reason for the collapse of the Soviet 
system rests with the interest of the party-state elite in transferring to capitalism, mainly to obtain
higher incomes and make their privileges inheritable (Kotz and Weir, 1997, 5 and part II).24 The 
self-interest of the part-state elite was fostered by the authoritarian nature of the Soviet system. 
Laibman has also reached a complementary conclusion: 
So the socialist economy was not the source of the collapse; to the contrary, both central and 
decentral planning and plan execution were alive and well. Their potentials however could not be 
adequately realized without a through reckoning with the legacy of the Stalin-era authoritarian 
deformation. In these conditions, socialist reform was a razor edge, an unstable path between twin 
abysses: resurgent bureaucratic control on one side, and a slide into anarchy and destruction of 
socialism as such, on the other. The source of the demise was indeed structural, but it was not the 
political economy of socialist planning, but the political culture that arose in the difficult 
circumstances of Soviet social construction that lay at its heart. (Laibman, 2007, 184-185).
Conclusion: On Transitions and Building
The socialist community spirit Cohen finds to be necessary to enable the inequalities of socialist 
equality of opportunity to be ameliorated can be prevented from taking root either by the self-
interested motivation of either the market or of an authoritarian bureaucracy. But, placing one’s 
hope on the growth of socialist values by using the mechanism that consistently fosters values 
24 Mandel also provides a detailed Marxist analysis of the Soviet bureaucracy along complementary limes; see 
Mandel, 1992. 
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that are contrary to socialism is unnecessary since the planning process allows for the effective 
transfer of information and is not a contradictory basis for the development of socialist values. 
The feasibility of socialism is impossible to accurately gauge, but we do have the advantage of 
theories that provide a clearer conception of what may work than Cohen thought. 
The ground which socialism will be built is the inadequacy of capitalism to meet the needs 
of human development. The fostering of socialist values will arise out of the struggle for 
socialism that a revolutionary class must develop to transition to another mode of production. 
Only by developing the self-consciousness of a revolutionary class can socialist values develop. 
Cohen forgot that the origin of socialism lies within capitalism.25 To quote Marx and Engels on 
the matter:
When people speak of ideas that revolutionize society, they do but express the fact, that within the 
old society, the elements of a new one have been created, and that the dissolution of the old ideas 
keeps pace with the dissolution of the old conditions of existence. (Marx and Engels, 1968, 51).26
Cohen’s discussion of why socialism is appealing is structured by a thought experiment of 
how undesirable it would be to take a camping trip where we conduct self-interested market 
exchanges the whole time. But, if capitalism is a camping trip where we do conduct self-
interested market exchanges the whole time, and we know that we don’t have to, how long will it
take us to try something else with the correct accompanying sentiment? In other words, isn’t the 
reason we will try something else is because we are dissatisfied with what we have? 
25
 In an earlier article by Cohen on how proletarians do not have the option, as a class, to become independent 
producers, one could infer that the structures of capitalism, the forced nature of proletarian class position, would 
lead to the formation of revolutionary class-consciousness (Cohen, 1983). Cohen does not draw this conclusion in 
the article being considered in this paper.
26 Mandel has an interesting analysis on the formation of revolutionary consciousness; See Mandel, 1994, 77-127. 
He is particularity interested in how the relationship between a revolutionary party and vanguard members of the 
working class develops due to fluctuations in the business cycle and other crises. 
20
This may seem to be the answer to Cohen’s dilemma of how to make people use the market 
to foster communal reciprocity. But, societies need supportive mechanisms that complement 
their value structure. A revolutionary situation provides the basis for transition but the desire for 
something different is because we have needs to be fulfill other than the need for a transition. 
The building of socialism and the transition to it are interrelated phenomena. But, this doesn’t 
mean they are inseparable phenomena. Anti-capitalist sentiment is produced by the conditions of 
capitalism. But, will capitalism produce socialist sentiment? I would say not enough socialist 
sentiment to build a mature socialist society where the results of regrettable choice and option 
luck are a thing of the past. Simply put, the undesirable results of capitalism produce the 
sentiment to transition to socialism but only democratic planning will foster the sentiment to 
build a mature socialist society. 
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